On Mill's well-known and oft-criticized ‘proof’ of theprinciple of utility from his 1861 Utilitarianism, to showthat something is visible, we must show that it is seen; and to showthat something is audible, we must show that it is heard;analogously,
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This reading, however, does not withstand scrutiny, as ThomasBrobjer (1998) has argued. As Brobjer notes, the only otherpublished discussion of the laws of Manu, in Twilight of theIdols, is highly critical, not laudatory (pp. 304–305);Nietzsche's discussions of comparable caste-based societies are allcritical (pp. 308–309); and Nietzsche's unpublished notebooks containnumerous entries on the theme “a critique of the Laws ofManu” (pp. 310–312). The passage from The Antichristonly seems laudatory when read out of context; as Brobjerremarks:
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Yet in claiming that pleasure or power are valuable, Mill and theN-Realist Nietzsche are advancing a normative thesis. The truth of thisnormative thesis, however, simply does not follow from thecorresponding descriptive thesis.
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(P′) now is simply a different formulation of the (IC): if weaccept the (IC) then we should accept (P′). But what happens,then, if we grant the truth of Descriptive Hedonism: namely, that onlypleasure is, in fact, desired. In that case, it would now follow thatonly pleasure is desirable (ought to be desired) (assuming, again, thatValue Nihilism is false). That is, since something ought to be desiredonly if it can be desired (internalism), then if only xcan be desired, then only x ought to be desired(assuming that Value Nihilism is false).
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Talk of “the only game in town” is far too metaphorical,however, to bear the philosophical weight demanded. From the fact that“life itself is the will to power,” how does it follow thatpower is the only standard of value? From the fact, forexample, that all life obeys the laws of fundamental physics, nothingfollows about the appropriate standard of value. What Schacht andothers seem to have in mind is something like John Stuart Mill'sargument for utilitarianism, which proceeds from the premise that sincehappiness is the only thing people desire or aim for, it follows thathappiness is the only thing that possesses intrinsic value. Thisargument, though, is famously unsuccessful: from the fact that onlyhappiness is desired, nothing at all follows about whatought to be desired. Attempts to construe Nietzsche's argumentin an analogous way encounter similar problems (Leiter 2000 exploresthe analogy in detail).