This and other problems with cross-world identity suggest that someother weaker relation, of similarity or what David Lewis callscounterparthood, should be employed in a possible world analysis ofmodal discourse. Since similarity is not transitive this allows us tosay that the bicycle might have had some different parts without havingto say that it might have been wholly different. On the other hand,such a substitution does not seem unproblematic, for a claim about whatI might have done hardly seems, at first sight, to becorrectly interpretable as a claim about what someone else(however similar to me) does in another possible world (Kripke 1980,note 13).
This argument differs from the standard version of Evans's argumentby not depending upon identity-involving properties (e.g. being suchthat it is indeterminate whether she is Omega) to establishdistinctness, and this removes some sources of controversy. Others, ofcourse, remain.
Information Philosophy rejects the Identity Thesis.
The third challenge is the most troublesome of all. In section 2it was noted that Leibniz's Law (and its contrapositive) appear to becrucial to our understanding of identity and distinctness. But itseems that the defender of strong Composition as Identity must denythis. After all, the bricks are many, but the wall is one. The onus isthus on the defender of strong Composition as Identity to explain whywe should think the “are” in hybrid identity statementsreally expresses the relation of identity.
Character thesis essay identity
To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same.“Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; theirmeanings are identical. However, they have more than one meaning. Adistinction is customarily drawn between qualitative andnumerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitativeidentity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitativelyidentical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical becausethey share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go alongwith that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitativeidentity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitativeidentity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its nameimplies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation inaccordance with which we can properly count (or number) things:x and y are to be properly counted as one just incase they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).
Thesis: DEVELOPING A DOCTORAL IDENTITY – A …
In its earlier version the argument is merely that following Quine'ssuggestion to interpret a language in which some expression is anI-predicate so that the I-predicate expresses classical identity sinsagainst a highly intuitive methodological programme enunciated by Quinehimself, namely that as our knowledge expands we should unhesitatinglyexpand our ideology, our stock of predicables, but should be much morewary about altering our ontology, the interpretation of our bound namevariables (1972: 243).
Thesis: Stages of Identity Theft
Geach's argument is that in view of the mere possibility of carvingout of a language L, in which the relational expressions,E1, E2,E3… are not I-predicates, sub-languagesL1, L2,L3… in which these expressions areI-predicates, if Quine's suggested proposal of reinterpretation ispossible for each Ln, the user ofL will be committed to any number of entities not quantifiedover in L, namely, for each Ln,those entities for which the I-predicate ofLn (En) givesa criterion of absolute identity. This will be so because any sentenceof L will retain its truth conditions in anyLn to which it belongs, reinterpreted asQuine proposes, but “of course, it is flatly inconsistent to saythat as a member of a large theory a sentence retains itstruth-conditions but not its ontological commitment”(1973:299).