The relegation of hypotheses and theories to oblivion, without getting a fair hearing, as the , only to be vindicated many years later, has been a typical dynamic. The man who first explained the dynamics behind the , Kristian Birkeland, died in obscurity in 1917, . It was not until that Birkeland’s work was finally vindicated. , the widely accepted theory of how , , and other organelles came to be, , quickly dismissed, and not revived until the late 1960s.
I was also regularly dismayed by orthodox scientific and academic works that dealt with the human brain, consciousness, human nature, , FE technology, and the like, in which the authors accepted declassified government documents at face value (as in not wondering what else remained classified, for starters) or looked no further than 19th-century investigations. Direct personal experience is far more valuable than all of the experimental evidence that be amassed; there is no substitute for it, as that is where comes from. Armchair scientists who accept the skeptics' word for it have taken the easy way out and rely on unreliable "investigators" to tell them about the nature of reality. They consequently do not have informed opinions, or perhaps more accurately, they have opinions. The holy warriors’ efforts aside, the scientific data is impressive regarding what has been called “psi” and other terms, which clearly demonstrated abilities of consciousness that are still denied and neglected by mainstream science. , but he was a voice in the wilderness.
with respect to the global teenager hypothesis.
As this form of counterfactual suggests, the structural equations areto be read from right to left: the antecedent of the counterfactualstates possible values of the variables throughto and the consequent states the correspondingvalue of the endogenous variable . There is a counterfactualof this kind for every combination of possible values of the variables through to . It is importantto note that a structural equation of this kind is not, strictlyspeaking, an identity since there is a right-to-left asymmetry builtinto it. This asymmetry corresponds to the asymmetry ofnon-backtracking counterfactuals. For example, supposing that theactual situation is one in which neither Suzy nor Billy throws a rockso the bottle does not shatter, the non-backtracking counterfactual“If either Suzy or Billy had thrown a rock, the bottle wouldhave shattered” is true. But the counterfactual “If thebottle had shattered, either Suzy or Billy would have thrown arock” is false.
Teenagers and social network sites: ..
Thus, in the example of the Indian famine, we contrast the actualsituation in which a famine occurs with another situation in whichnormal conditions prevail and a famine does not occur. A cause is thenthought of as a factor that makes the difference between thesesituations; and the background conditions are thought of as thosefactors that are common to the two situations. In different contextsof enquiry, the contrast situation is framed in different terms. Afarmer may take the contrast situation to be the normal situation inwhich the government does not stockpile food reserves but there is nofamine. In this case it would be reasonable for the farmer to identifythe drought as the factor that makes the difference between thiscontrast situation and the actual situation in which there isfamine. On the other hand, an official of the World Food Authoritywith a different conception of what normally happens may take thecontrast situation to be one in which governments build up foodreserves as a precaution against droughts. Consequently, it would bereasonable for the official to see the failure of the government tobuild up food reserves as the factor that makes the difference betweenthe contrast situation and the actual situation in which there is afamine. (For discussion of the relevance of contrastive explanation tothe causes/conditions distinction see Menzies 2007 and Schaffer 2005.)
National and global surveys in 2010 report that 46 percent of ..
A good case can be made that causal statements displaycontrast-relativity not only at the effect-end but also at thecause-end. (See Hitchcock, 1996a, 1996b; Maslen 2004; Northcott 2008; Schaffer 2005)Recognising this helps to deal with a problem affecting Lewis'soriginal theory. In evaluating whether an event c caused anevent e, Lewis's theory says we have to consider what wouldhave happened in those closest worlds in which c did notoccur. For example, in evaluating whether the camper's lighting of thefire caused the forest, we have to consider what would have happenedin those closest possible worlds in which the camper's action oflighting the fire did not occur. Are these worlds in which the camperdoes not light the fire but does something else instead, or are theyworlds in which he lights the fire in slightly different manner(perhaps with a lighter instead of matches) or at a slightly differenttime (three minutes later when the wind died down)? In order to answersuch questions, Lewis says it is necessary to say how much of a changeor a delay it takes for an event to become an altogether differentevent, rather than a different version of the same event. (Lewissometimes discusses this issue as the question of how fragile eventsare: event is one which cannot occur in adifferent manner or at a different time from its actual manner andtime of occurrence. See Lewis 1986b.) The problem, as he sees it, isthat there is no unique principled way in which we do this: there islinguistic indeterminancy about what event nominals refer to. Hewrites: “We have not made up our minds: and if we presuppose sometimesone answer and sometimes another answer, we are entirely within ourlinguistic rights. This is itself a big problem for a counterfactualanalysis of causation, quite apart from the problem of preemption.”(2000, p.186)